Sir Jeremy Greenstock's questioning of the legitimacy – as opposed to the legality – of the Iraq war raises two pretty big questions of politics and international and law. Who decides if a war is legitimate? Who decides if it's legal? Are these just matters of opinion, to be determined ultimately by whoever has the most power, ie the US? In the case of Iraq, it's clear that Tony Blair subcontracted the decision to George Bush in early 2002.

Appearing at the Iraq inquiry this morning, Greenstock was less overtly critical of government policy than Sir Christopher Meyer was but both seem to have come to the same conclusion – that the diplomatic process was undermined by the military timetable and the commitment that Blair had given Bush that Britain would back regime change if it came to it.

Unlike Meyer, Greenstock professed a degree of ignorance of this policy, at least initially. He claimed not to have been naive but to have been ill-informed. His main line was that he and senior ministers were legitimately trying to negotiate a diplomatic solution to the problem of Iraqi defiance of the UN over weapons of mass destruction. It all sounds plausible, until you read Scott Ritter or look at the Cabinet Office's March 2002 Iraq options paper, which makes clear that the policy Greenstock was pursuing – of sending in the UN weapons inspectors backed up by the threat of force – was rejected in favour of a policy of regime change on the pretext of seeking disarmament.

This leaked document has not so far been officially confirmed by the inquiry and once again a gap is appearing between what is being said at the inquiry and what the contemporaneous documents show. But what Greenstock did acknowledge was that once Blair had promised to support war if it became necessary or once the UN process was exhausted, it was Bush's call. Blair's condition was therefore circular and pointless. Greenstock clearly thought there was a case for continuing with weapons inspections in 2003, but there was no prospect of convincing the US of that, so we had to go in with them or see them go it alone. The latter option would, apparently, have been calamitous. As we heard yesterday, as soon as Bush had fixed on regime change, it was seen that there was no point in going against him. At no point did anyone in the government consider that not agreeing to go along with the war might have made it politically impossible for Bush.

On the linked but separate issues of legitimacy and legality, it is apparently all a matter of opinion. Greenstock argued that the war was of questionable legitimacy because it did not command international or domestic support. But it cannot be held illegal because Britain has not been successfully challenged. In the absence of an international supreme court, the legality of the invasion will remain a matter of opinion, with no definitive conclusion possible. Perhaps the inquiry will be the judge of that.

In the meantime, Greenstock is setting himself up as judge and jury in his own case. Ironically, the key issue is who decides who decides, ie whose opinion was valid as to whether UN security council resolution 1441 required further approval from the council to authorise war. Greenstock says his diplomacy was clever (too clever for its own good, he admits) in negotiating a resolution that did not make this explicit. Any other security council member that agreed the resolution but took a different line – well, they would say that wouldn't they? It surely must have occurred to him that, well, he would take his own particular line, wouldn't he? To say otherwise is would be to undermine himself. Didn't every Foreign Office legal adviser say the war would be illegal without a further resolution?

In a written statement to the inquiry, Greenstock openly admitted that one of the reasons why Britain could not agree that a further resolution was necessary was that to do otherwise would undermine the basis on which Britain bombed Iraq in 1998.

To have conceded that the use of force against Iraq was not legal under international law unless the security council took a specific, fresh decision would have been to reject the basis under which military action was taken in December 1998.

So we would say that, wouldn't we?

It was a very careful, self-justifying performance from a former ambassador with an admitted propensity to cover his and his country's diplomatic tracks. Prove me wrong, seemed to be his challenge to the inquiry. Despite a mountain of evidence, the committee seemed reluctant to do this. Maybe they feel sympathy for a man who put his heart and soul into seeking Iraqi disarmament, apparently unaware that regime change was the real agenda. I'm not so sure.

www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/nov/27/jeremy-greenstock-iraq-war-inquiry

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