at attempt is under way, led by nations that want to avoid a U.S. occupation of Iraq. For Washington, the important issue is not whether Hussein goes but whether it controls Iraq afterward. For Hussein, the question is whether there is any reason to leave.

Analysis

Behind the public obsession with weapons of mass destruction, one of the United States' not-particularly-hidden goals in Iraq has been regime change. Although that goal has been clear, what precisely would constitute "regime change" is less obvious. What exactly does the United States mean by regime change? What would satisfy Washington?

Opponents of a war with Iraq, both European and Islamic, have tried to use the WMD issue and the United Nations apparatus to prevent a U.S. attack. It has become clear that this is not going to work, and they therefore have turned their attention to another war-avoidance strategy, trying to get Saddam Hussein to resign and accept exile. In doing this, they would be able, in their minds, to deliver regime change to the United States without a war. This leaves three questions: First, why do these countries oppose war; second, would the United States accept Hussein's resignation as an end to the Iraq chapter; and third, would Hussein accept exile under any circumstances?

The motives of the anti-war nations are far from humanitarian. Many of the same countries that were agitating for war against Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic suddenly find war with Iraq intolerable. Their real motivation is fear that the United States, once it occupies Iraq, not only will dominate the region, but use Iraq as a base from which to extend its control throughout the Arabian Peninsula, with inevitable political and economic consequences. For European states like France, Germany and Italy, an already unmanageable United States would swell in power. For countries like Saudi Arabia or Iran -- none of which have any use for Iraq -- the possibility of U.S. military power on their borders, based in an Iraq completely under U.S. control, is something they don't want to think about. If Hussein's regime was destroyed through war, this would be the outcome.

Therefore, it would be best if war could be avoided. If the war aim can be defined downward simply to involve Hussein's resignation -- and if that resignation could be arranged -- war could be avoided. A new personality would emerge to govern Iraq and he undoubtedly would cooperate with weapons inspectors and life would go on -- without the U.S. Third Infantry Division parked on the border of Saudi Arabia or U.S. fighters patrolling the skies over the entire region. Or without a U.S.-dominated military government handing out contracts for oil field reconstruction. It therefore makes perfect sense for Saudi, Iranian, Russian and German leaders and a slew of others to try to negotiate Hussein out of Baghdad.

The United States normally personalizes its foreign policy goals, demonizing the leader and his immediate lieutenants but leaving vague its position on the rest of the governing apparatus. Therefore, the Bush administration has left it deliberately vague as to what it means by regime change. Officials have referred to the Japanese model, in which a U.S.-controlled military government allowed the Japanese bureaucracy to continue to function while eliminating a thin layer of leaders. Of course, the Japanese model was built on unconditional surrender: It was not negotiated, it was imposed.

The United States is utterly torn on the negotiated aspect of this war. On the one hand, negotiation with some members of the senior military or government officials is built into the war plan. The U.S. government hopes that, at some point during the war, there will be a coup in Baghdad that would allow U.S. forces to enter without opposition. This would leave some members of the regime and Ba'ath Party in office, but it would leave the U.S. military in control of them and in control of Iraq through them. That is why the Bush administration keeps mentioning Japan. The United States controlled Japan completely but governed through former Japanese government officials at the sub-cabinet level and below.

Hussein's resignation, even if it included the top layer of his government, would not provide the United States complete control over the new regime, which is precisely why so many countries -- including Egypt and Saudi Arabia -- favor it. Egyptian diplomatic sources in Europe tell Stratfor that a high-ranking Iraqi official, possibly Ali Hassan al Majid, will meet with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo on Jan. 18 or 19 to discuss eleventh-hour strategies to avert a war. One of the most likely strategies would be to secure Hussein's retirement while leaving a strong-willed government led by Ba'ath party officials in power.

But the issue is not personnel. The United States could live with exactly the same leaders who might ascend after Hussein's resignation if it could control them and bring troops into the country. But Washington could not live with that leadership if it were not under U.S. control and if U.S. forces were kept out of the country.

Therefore, the U.S. response to any resignation by Hussein would be to demand that a peacekeeping force be bought into Iraq to guarantee that there are no weapons of mass destruction and to aid in the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. Washington would want U.S. forces playing a leading role in this peacekeeping force. The reasons would have little to do with WMD and even less to do with humanitarian concerns; they would have to do with making certain that, at the end of the day, Iraq was under U.S. control.

Of course, since that is exactly the reason for war opponents to engineer Hussein's exile -- to prevent U.S. domination -- the engineers would be rushing their own forces into the country to make certain that no vacuum was filled by the United States. The brute power politics of all parties would be filled with the rhetoric of humanitarianism, national self-determination, the rights of the Iraqi people and so on.

All of this leaves the question of whether Hussein has any interest in a deal. Unlike most issues in geopolitics, this has a strong personal component. Hussein's personality frequently has been likened to that of Hitler, usually by people who have met neither. Hitler could have capitulated much earlier, saving Germany the last months of the war. That would not have been incompatible with a suicide, but he did not choose that route. Would Hussein rather be dead than in exile? Would he rather die at the end of a brutal war than before it, sparing his country? It is easy to have opinions on this, but much harder to know what he would do.

Let's begin here. Hussein is a risk-taker: Throughout his life he has endangered his life in order to hold onto or increase his power. Since he is not risk-averse, the fact that he might die in a coming war is not going to be the determining factor; the probability of his dying in that war or losing it and becoming a prisoner is the determining factor. To be more precise, his perception of the risks will determine what he will do. In the past, he had a pretty good sense of the risks.

Hussein has nothing to gain from a war and a great deal to lose. He will do anything to prevent or postpone a war. He has used the U.N. inspections regime skillfully to delay the war and still has hopes that it might prevent one. He undoubtedly will use the possibility of resignation and exile in the same way -- holding out hope to those who want to avoid a war, trapping the United States in a position from which it cannot launch an attack because a peaceful solution would appear imminent.

There is a risk for Hussein, though, in flirting with this idea: If his followers come to believe that he actually is considering leaving office, a power struggle for replacing him immediately would emerge, and they even might stage an internal coup. Therefore, Hussein will have to flirt publicly while making it clear domestically that he has no intention of leaving. In fact, he has to do this even if he expects to leave -- otherwise, his entire bargaining position on the terms of his exile might disintegrate. So external indications of interest will be coupled with increased internal controls, making it impossible to tell whether or not he is serious. Of course, since those negotiating his exit are not really interested in exile as much as preventing or delaying a war, they will collaborate with him in putting off the decisive moment when he leaves the country -- they don't want to know whether he is bluffing or not.

If Hussein was certain that (1) the United States will launch a war and (2) that he will be defeated, that would be the circumstance under which he would consider exile. He still is not completely certain that the United States will attack -- or at least, that it will attack before the summer. He also is not certain that the United States would defeat him in a war.

From where Hussein sits, the United States is afraid to take casualties. His view of history is that ever since Vietnam, the United States has waged its wars in such a way as to prevent or minimize casualties. When U.S. forces started taking casualties, as in Beirut or Somalia, they withdrew. In Afghanistan, the United States avoids casualties by staying close to its strongholds. Regardless of whether this perception is true, this is what Hussein -- and others -- believe about the United States.

Hussein believes he can inflict heavy casualties on the United States. He apparently thinks that using chemical weapons against U.S. forces during an advance on Baghdad, and forcing U.S. toops into house-to-house fighting in the city, will raise the number and fear of more casualties sufficiently that the United States will accept a U.N.-sponsored cease-fire. In his view, Iraqi forces are capable of achieving this. He may not be certain of it, but recall that Hussein is a risk-taker. The probability is high enough that he can inflict casualties and that the United States will retreat in the face of those casualties that he is willing to risk the war rather than accept exile.

One of the reasons for this is that human rights groups and others have made it clear that anyone accused of war crimes should stand trial before an international tribunal. Amnesty International recently made this demand. From Hussein's point of view -- and he has seen the fate of Milosevic -- regardless of what Saudi or Russian leaders may promise, he eventually could wind up in The Hague and spend the rest of his life in prison. As unattractive as exile in Khartoum or Tripoli might be for him, the former prospect is even worse. We suspect that if there is any gray area, Hussein will hold on. It is a fascinating paradox that the very forces that are most vigorously opposing a war also are those that would make a compromise settlement impossible, since Hussein certainly will demand amnesty before he goes and it is not clear who, if anyone, can provide him that blanket amnesty.

Therefore, it is possible that there will be a coup that forces Hussein into exile -- and it is certain that Hussein will use the exile issue to his advantage -- but it is difficult to imagine circumstances under which he voluntarily would go into exile. It is equally difficult to imagine a coup, at least until the war begins. One might add that whoever stages the coup would be nearly as morally unsavory as Hussein and would not solve any of the issues on the table unless he acceded to U.S. demands. Since accession to Washington's demands is precisely what those trying to negotiate exile fear most, an internally forced exile that satisfies everyone would be the hardest to reach.

The ultimate dilemma of exile is that nothing being offered to Hussein is particularly safe or attractive. He apparently is not convinced that he cannot fight the United States to a draw, and he is not certain that there will even be a war. For Hussein, the exile issue is a tool designed to confuse his audience and buy time.

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